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COMMENTARY ON LAW:
WALLOWING IN INTENTION
Gene R. Nichol*
Professor Law, as is her practice, 1 has offered a powerful and
provocative comment on American constitutional jurisprudence. Her
arguments are straightforward. After examining the constitutional
founders' ideas about families and women, she concludes that judges
cannot look to "the intent of the . . . framers to resolve constitutional
claims premised on conflicting visions of the family." 2 By implication,
however, her position is somewhat broader. Attempting to deflect
some aspects of the "original intent" critique of modern constitutional
decisionmaking, 3 Professor Law claims that a variety of controversial
privacy and equality decisions are not unfounded merely because they

*Cutler Professor of Constitutional Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, College
of William and 1\lary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
1. For other works by Professor Law, see, especially, her exploration of the privacy/sexual
autonomy decisions through a gender discrimination lens. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); see ge'lle'rally, e.g., Law, Economic Jnstice, in OuR
ENDANGERED RIGHTS 134-59 (Dorsen ed. 1984).
2. Law, Tlze Founders Fat/ze,-s on Families, 39 U. FLA L. REv. 583, 585 (1987).
3. Primarily, of course, the "originalist" claim has been emphasized recently by Att'y Gen.
1\leese. See, e.g., E. 1\leese, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985) [hereinafter Speech Before American Bar], 'tep-tinted in FEDERALIST SOCIETY, THE GREAT DEBATE:
INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 9 (Occasional Paper No. 2, 1986) [hereinafter
THE GREAT DEBATE) (calling for a "Jurisprudence of Original Intention"); E. Meese, Speech
Before the Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov. 15, 1985) [hereinafter Speech Before
Federalist Society], rep-tinted in THE GREAT DEBATE, sup-ra, at 36 (describing "Jurisprudence
of Original Intention"); see generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363-72 (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some Fi'fst Amendment Pmblems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
Early in her article, Professor Law cites to contemporary scholars who use the terms
"interpretivism" and "original intention" interchangeably - as does the Attorney General. See
Law, supm note 2, at 584 n.lO. But attempting to tie judicial descisionmaking to the language
of the constitutional text is different from limiting the interpretation of the text to the specific
intentions of the framers. Though claiming to approach "constitutional interpretation" beginning
"\vith the document itself," see, e.g., Speech Before Federalist Society, supra, at 33, the Attorney
General apparently has little interest in "strictly interpreting'' the first amendment to comply
with the "no law" textual command. See e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMJIIISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT (1986). For the originalist, the intentions of the framers often take on
greater significance than the words of the constitutional charter. Equal protection, for example,
is read to mean freedom from racial discrimination. I \vill use the terms "originalist'' and
"intentionalist'' to refer to advocates of the original intent doctrine.
613

614

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. :39

move beyond the contemplation of the framers. 4 Constitutional rulings
protecting abortion rights, 5 interests in sexual preference, 6 and sexual
equality, 7 for example, are not wrong simply because the architects
of our charter might not have agreed with them.
Intention fails as a decisionmaking guide, in her view, for two
reasons. First, the "people who crafted" the Constitution "held conflicting ideas and values about families and the role of women in society.""'
Accordingly, some difficulty is presented in locating the correct intention to instruct modern adjudication. Second, and more fundamentally,
the "founders' dominant conceptions of families denied the liberty,
equality, and even personhood of women." 9 Since this view is at odds
with an existing ''broad consensus across a moral and political spectrum"10 supporting the recognition of the full personhood of women,
our present task is to "envision constitutional and cultural arrangements that read the words 'We the People' quite literally, even though
that was not originally intended. "11 Issues of sexual equality and autonomy are our issues, not the founders'. In these matters at least,
we should let the framers rest.
Of course, taking on the challenge of commenting, or worse, responding to Professor Law's essay is no enviable task. The essay's
full texture and compelling conclusions call more for reflection than
refutation. The logical avenues of attack are either to attempt to rebut
the historical claims presented, or to deny the validity of the ramifications for modern constitutional analysis that Professor Law draws
from her review of the framers' world. In general, this commentary
will pursue neither course. I am not competent to do the former,I 2
and disinclined to try the latter. 13

4. For the decisions Professor Law seeks to rescue from condemnation specifically, see
Law, supra note 2, at.
5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (refusing to extend privacy rights to
the protection of homosexual conduct).
7. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1970) (statute that preferred male estate administrators over equally qualified females declared unconstitutional).
8. See Law, supra note 2, at 585.
9. ld.
10. Id.
11. ld.
12. I will note a small historical inaccuracy, but one which only serves to bolster Professor
Law's description of the framers' disregard for the personhood of women. In making the accurate
claim that "[s]ilence, absolute and deafening, is the central theme of the [Founding Fathers']
discussions of women and families," Professor Law refers to the absence of references to women
and families in the constitutional debates, the Federalist papers, etc. See Law, supra note 2,
at 586 n13. A reference to women in Madison's Notes, and I think (or at least Walter Dellinger
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My goal, instead, is a more limited one. First, I will disagree
briefly with the interpretive significance Professor Law draws from
the framers' conflicting views about the rights of women. Second, and
more important, I will explore a particular contribution to the debate
over the use of original intent in constitutional interpretation that the
Law essay provides.
Professor Law's rejection of the use of original intent to instruct
contemporary decisionmaking in privacy/equality cases is based in part
on the assertion that the framers entertained "conflicting ideas . . .
about families and the role of women in society."14 After describing
what she characterizes as the dominant view of families in the
eighteenth century, one lodged completely in patriarchy and male
supremacy, Professor Law offers a second story. This contrasting
picture, also a segment of our constitutional legacy, reveals greater
gender equality and sexual freedom. 15 The process is repeated for the
drafters of the fourteenth amendment. Dominant nineteenth century
assumptions denied women the ability to take part in most economic
and political activity, and did so in a more purposeful manner than
ever before. 16 The competing, hopeful story emphasizes that the post
Civil War era was a time when women took part in public activities
in great numbers, and when society highly regarded the role of women
as mothers and homemakers. 17 Professor Law suggests the tensions
between these competing vistas renders the use of the founders'
intentions problematic. To my mind, however, the interpretive lesson
that Professor Law seeks to glean from these contrasting visions is
exaggerated.
Law's optimistic eighteenth century story stems from two distinct
features of colonial life: the momentum of the Enlightenment's desire

informs me that it is so) the only reference to women contained in the debates, which Professor
Law missed, is a rejected version of the fugitive slave clause: "If any person bound to service
or labor in any of the United States, shall escape into another State, he or she shall not be
discharged from such service or labor ... but shall be delivered up to the person justly claiming
their service or labor." J. l\1ADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 631 (E. Scott
ed. 1970) (emphasis added). There is, of course, no small irony in the fact that only on this
issue would the need to mention women arise.
13. There are, of course, those who would make such a claim with no small persuasive
appeal. See, e.g., Monaghan, Our Pe-rfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981).
14. See Law, sup-l"a note 2, at 585.
15. ld. at 594.
16. Id. at 608.
17. ld.
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to end passivity and dependence in politics and religion, 18 and women's
increased political and social participation generated by the exigencies
of the Revolutionary War. 19 Professor Law concedes, however, that
the framers' culture interfered with their perceptions, and prevented
them from seeing that the revolution's "anti-patriarchal" ideals would
directly affect women and familes. 20 Her argument rooted in the potential of Enlightenment thought therefore actually collapses into a quite
distinct line of attack, which I will address in the second half of this
commentary - that the framers' concept of the role of women is so
much at odds with our later constitutional development that it should
simply be rejected. 21
I assume it is true, on the other hand, that women experienced
subtle stirrings of augmented power during the Revolutionary period.
But managing farms and businesses, participating in political boycotts,
soliciting funds for the war effort, expanding (though still minimal)
property rights, and even some increasing flexibility in marital decisionmaking22 do not rise to the level of debilitating framer discord
on the theories of liberty that modern privacy and equality decisions
implicate. Moreover, Professor Law's characterization of the patriarchal image of family as the "dominant" strand of eighteenth century
thought effectively concedes that the specific legislative purposes of
the Bill of Rights did not include the protection of either non-traditional
family practices or sexual equality.
The competing visions offered of the world of 1868 similarly pose
little actual interpretive difficulty. Law's optimistic view of nineteenth
century thought stresses the writings of John Stuart Mill, women's
heavy participation in the abolitionist movement, the Seneca Falls
Convention, and the granting of the franchise to women in two states.
But, as she also explains, the rebuff to women's equality reflected in
the Civil War Amendments was, if anything, more dramatic than the
omission of constitutional protections in 1791. Section two of the fourteenth amendment put the word "male" in the Constitution for the
first time. Prominent feminists accordingly campaigned against its

18. ld. at 594 (citing F. WEINSTEIN & G. PLATT, THE WISH TO BE FREE: SOCIETY,
PSYCHE AND VALUE CHANGE 49 (1969)).
19. Law, supra note 2, at 595-97.
20. ld. at 594.
21. See infra notes 26-60 and accompanying text.
22. See Law, supra note 2, at 597-99.
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enactment. Furthermore, Congress rejected efforts to include the
word "sex" in the fifteenth amendment's guarantee of the right to
vote. 23
I do not mean to imply that no one believed in sexual equality or
autonomy in either 1791 or 1868. Any fair reading of the history of
those periods, however, including Professor Law's, would necessarily
conclude that se:A"Ual independence and gender parity, as we know
those terms, were then beyond our general societal ken. This may
seem obvious and insignificant. But recall that Professor Law's thesis
is presented as rebuttal to a claim. She begins with the acknowledgment that "many influential lawyers, scholars, judges, and public officials urge us to look to the original intent of the men who drafted
and ratified the Constitution to determine its contemporary meaning."21 She counters, in part, that such a venture is impossible in
actions based on disputed family and sexual roles because the framers'
visions themselves were in conflict. She points, however, to no widely
held theories of liberty, in either 1791 or 1868, that would embrace,
for example, the right to procure an abortion, to engage in heterosexual or homosexual sodomy, to obtain contraceptives for minors, or to
protect illegitimates from discrimination. These are the types of cases
that Professor Law seeks to rescue from attack at the hands of a
"Jurisprudence of Original Intent." But here the conflict argument
disappears.
As Professor Law claims, we probably should refuse to tie constitutional interpretation to the specific notions of liberty and equality its
draftsmen entertained. But that is not because, in the circumstances
giving rise to the controversial decisions Professor Law seeks to defend, the framers' designs are contradictory. The demands of theRevolutionary War, like those of later wars, gave women a more prominent role in public life. But they merely became more visible, not
more equal. The laws of coverture and dependence Professor Law
identifies were crafted to prevent the full development of women. By
the time of the Civil War Amendments, the women's movement had
begun to wage its long battle for progress. But the struggle lasted
decades, and for the better part of a century was unsuccessful. The
"separate spheres" notion that Professor Law describes was consciously constructed to thwart the nascent move toward female emancipation. At some level, the framers may have disagreed on the role

23. ld. at 606.
24. Id. at 584.

618

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA lV REVIEW

[Vol. :39

women should play in society. They showed precious little confusion,
however, about the unequal status of women under the law. 25
As explained below, it is a strange effort to explore the minds of
the framers to find constitutional answers to problems concerning, for
example, contraception, teenage pregnancy, the eased access to abortion resulting from technological change, and the spiritual and ethical
conundrum created by modern developments such as surrogate
motherhood and test tube babies. Despite Law's arguments, however,
those who do advocate interpretation via original intent can confidently
assert that the framers of the fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments
had no acknowledged desire to assure non-traditional sexual autonomy
or gender equality. Professor Law's essay offers no serious rejoinder
to that claim. Substantial indication of this view lies in the fact that
the optimistic views proffered are not in any way linked to the men
who drafted and ratified the Constitution. Professor Law, instead,
focuses on pockets of colonial or Reconstruction thought that provide
more hopeful portraits of the full humanity of women and children.
For the rigid inti:mtionalist, these pockets represent, at most, loser's
history, even if the losses were short term in nature. They do not,
as Professor Law suggests, render it impossible to conclude that the
framers' conceptions of liberty and equality did not embrace what in
the latter decades of the twentieth century we consider the rights of
women.
But this criticism goes only to a minor plank in the Law platform.
"The Founders on Families" demonstrates the far more significant
claim that the framers' conceptions of women and family were so
dramatically different from our own that they cannot be made the
basis for modern constitutional decisionmaking. In the process, Professor Law's essay offers a noteworthy contribution to the debate on
decisionmaking by original intent. In a relatively brief essay, she immerses the reader in a world rarely explored in constitutional jurisprudence -that of the American woman of the eighteenth and nineteenth

25. Of course, using the concrete intentions of the Constitution's framers to determine the
outer boundaries of contemporary adjudication begs the question of the level of generality to
be given to broad guarantees to liberty and equality. It is, on that score, a controversial
undertaking. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text for a discussion. Given an elevated
level of generality, a conflict between the aspirations of the Enlightenment and the specific
conceptions of sexual equality held by the framers could be engendered. That, however, is not
the sort of clash that Professor Law describes. See generally Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791
(1983).
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centuries. In the course of the inquiry, we learn a great deal about
the heavy use of original intent in constitutional decisionmaking. It is
to that lesson that I now turn.
At first glance, the original intent critique of modern constitutional
jurisprudence is e:l\"tremely attractive. 26 The present constitutional
landscape is littered with decisions such as those demanding the busing
of school children, prohibiting prayer in the schools, and limiting the
state's ability to proscribe abortions, which have on occasion been the
subject of massive public disapproval. It is broadly understood that
constitutional interpretation involves more than reading opinion polls.
But the relationship between such controversial rulings and the text
of our fundamental charter has sometimes appeared tenuous. And if
Supreme Court decisionmaking represents mere policy choice, can it
truly be said to be constitutional interpretation at all? Posing an argument from democracy, therefore, the originalist concludes that "[t]he
will and judgment of persons accountable to the electorate should be
limited not by the countervailing will and judgment of the judiciary,
but only by the will and judgment of the Framers. "27 Not only is this
vision of judicial power demanded by our commitment to majority
rule, but it reflects the popular "civics book"28 understanding of the
distribution of governmental authority in the American political system. Judges apply the law; they don't make it. And when judges move
beyond the intended meaning of a legal provision, they exceed their
authority.
This appealing claim has been attacked from a number of directions.
As several commentators have noted, it is far from clear who the
relevant framers are. 29 Participants in the state legislatures or ratifying conventions, rather than the actual draftsmen, are the most logical
candidates. But pinpointing the specific intentions of so large and
diverse a group is problematic and records of state deliberations, especially regarding the Civil War Amendments, are scanty.

26. By "originalist" I refer to what Professor Brest has described as an advocate of "strict
intentionalism." See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
REv. 204, 204 (1980). For the strict intentionalist, "[t]he whole aim of construction, as applied
to a provision of the Constitution, is ... to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its Framers
and the people who adopted it." See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453
(1934).

27. See Perry, lnterpretivism, Freedom of Expression and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST.
L.J. 261, 276 (1981).
28. ld. at 276.
29. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11-41 (1980).
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Others have questioned the originalists' use of history. Strict intentionalism, as an interpretive device, assumes that constitutional decisionmaking can be grounded in a sufficiently clear understanding of
the framers' designs to eliminate judicial subjectivity. The Attorney
General, for example, has argued that "we lmow how the Founding
Fathers lived, and much of what they read, thought, and believed
.... We lmow who did what, when, and many times why."30 History
does provide reasonably clear portraits of the framers' intentions concerning some issues. 31 But on many ofthe most intractable and controversial aspects of constitutional jurisprudence, such as the incorporation
doctrine, freedom of the press, and separation of church and state,
the purposes of the framers are far from clear. Mark Tushnet has
suggested that the only way to bridge the gap between the founders
and ourselves is to "creatively construct" history. 32 "Particularly in
aspects that the interpretivists care about, [the past] is in essence
indeterminate . . . . "33 Uncertainty, however, seriously undermines
the rationale for originalism.
Professor Powell, on the other hand, has argued that the 1787
framers almost certainly did not view the Constitution as the embodiment of their specific intentions. 34 Late eighteenth century common
lawyers regarded a provision's intent not as what the drafters meant,
but rather as what judges, employing legal reason and judgment,
understood the words to mean. 35 Moreover, Madison himself claimed

30. Speech Before Federalist Society, supra note 3, at 33.
31. To my mind, indeterminancy alone does not defeat all uses of originalist jurisprudence.
It does seem plausible to conclude, for example, given the fifteenth amendment, that the framers
of the fourteenth amendment did not believe its provisions guaranteed voting rights. See, e.g.,
Justice Harlan's opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667-68 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). I also think, as I have argued here, that there is little doubt that the framers of
the Bill of Rights had no specific desire to assure gender equality. Still, intentionalist jurisprudence becomes massively indeterminate on many of the central issues of American constitutional
jurisprudence. The dispute over the incorporation doctrine is perhaps the best, and most important, example. Moreover, as I claim below, the originalist position has more flaws than mere
indeterminancy.
32. See Tushnet, supra note 25, at 800.
33. See id; see also Brest, supra note 26, at 222 ("[In most instances] the interpreter's
understanding of the original understanding [is] so indeterminate as to undermine the rationale
for originalism."); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y. U. L. REv. 469, 477 (1981) ("There
is no such thing as the intention of the Framers waiting to be discovered . . . . There is only
some such thing waiting to be invented.").
34. See generally Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885 (1985).
35. ld. at 896.
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that his knowledge of the views actually held by delegates to the
Philadelphia and Virginia conventions was a source of ''bias" in his
constitutional interpretations: "As a guide in expounding and applying
the provisions of the Constitution, the debates and incidental decisions
of the Convention can have no authoritative character."36 The
miginalist is thus required to reject the framers' specific belief that
their intentions would not be dispositive in constitutional interpretation. On historical grounds, these twin shortcomings of indeterminancy
and internal inconsistency leave the originalist path a difficult one to
navigate. 37
Others have leveled broader charges. Tom Grey has shown that a
stlingent and consistent application of the intentionalist theory, which
would cast into doubt, for example, the incorporation doctrine, substantive and much procedural due process protection, all equality jurisprudence as against the federal government and most against the
states, would require "an extraordinarily radical purge of established
constitutional doctrine. "38 Professor Dworkin has persuasively argued
that tying the interpretation of various phrases to the specific, concrete
intentions of the founders fundamentally mischaracterizes the nature
of some components of the Constitution. 39 A framers' intention, Dworkin claims, can be characterized "abstractly, as intending the enactment of the 'concept' of justice or equality [for example], or concretely,
as intending the enactment of his particular 'conception' of those con-

:36. Id. at 936 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821),
rep;-inted in 3 LE'ITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAlllES MADISON 228, 228 (Philadelphia
1865)). Consider also :Madison's claim that "difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and phrases used in such a charter ... and that it might require
a regular course of practice to liquidate and settle the meaning of some of them."
:37. See Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional
Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1240-43 (1984); Simon, The Autharity
of the Framers of the Constitutian: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1482 (1985).
38. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constituti()ll?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 713 (1975);
see also Nichol, Giving Substance Its Due (Book Review), 93 YALE L.J. 171, 185-87 (1983)
(quoting Grey, sup-ra, at 713). This is one example of radical politics that the Attorney General
apparently endorses. See Speech Before the American Bar, sup-ra note 3, at 7-9 (arguing for
the rejection of the incorporation doctrine).
39. Dworkin refers specificially to "what are often called 'vague' standards, for example,
the provision that the government shall not deny men due process of Jaw, or equal protection
of the Jaws." R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 133 (1977).
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cepts."40 Originalists demand that the religion clauses, the due process
and equal protection clauses, and the speech and press clauses be
given no more expansive interpretations than the particularized conceptions of the framers can support. But if those who drafted the
broad clauses of the Constitution had intended to set out "particular
conceptions," Dworkin argues, "they would have found the sort of
language conventionally used" to accomplish that task. 41 One is reminded, of course, of Edmund Randolph's claim that the Constitutional
Convention's Committee on Detail, in drafting the text, sought "[t]o
insert essential principles only, lest the operations of government
should be clogged by rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to be accommodated to times and events. "42
As a whole then, the arguments leveled against a "Jurisprudence
of Original Intent"43 are substantial. Professor Law's essay, however,
approaches intention from a different, and compelling, direction. Instead of exploring the vagaries of historiography or the nature of the
Constitution as law, "The Founders on Families" delves into the world
eighteenth and nineteenth century women experienced. Its tenor and
effect have little in common with the typical theoretical discussions of
what the framers meant or did not mean, and what the judicial ramifications of the inclusions or exclusions might be. As a result, we must
consider the Founders' intentions on a different plane, imagining their
relationships and their hierarchies and comparing them to our own.
This view into the sexual arrangements of our ancestors' world, how-

40. See Dworkin, supra note 33, at 490. But see Monaghan, supra note 13, at :379-80;
Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLU!Il. L. REv.
1029, 10:37-41 (1977); Perry, supra note 27, at 297-98; Tushnet, supra note 25, at 791 (each
challenging aspects of the Dworkin dichotomy). Dworkin has most frequently been criticized for
failing to carry the burden of demonstrating that the framers meant to constitutionalize concepts
rather than conceptions. See id. (framers' vision of law more positive and naturalistic than that
which Dworkin describes). These criticisms may well be correct, though it seems to me that
Professor Powell's work on original intention bolsters the Dworkin claim. I think, at a minimum,
Dworkin demonstrates that the use of language like "equal protection of the laws," "due process
of law," and "cruel and unusual punishment'' reflects a desire to enact constitutional principles
that reach beyond the specific applications of those principles contemplated by the framers. See
generally Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797, 814-821
(1982).
41. R. DWORKIN, supra note :39, at 136.
42. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 137 (1\l. Farrand ed.
1966).
43. The term is the Attorney General's. See Speech Before Federalist Society, supra note
3, at :36.
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ever, leaves its mark. It necessarily affects the way we regard decisionmaking according to the "intentions" of the framers. Next I will
attempt to explain why.
Most of the debate over original intent focuses on the appropriate
contours of clauses such as "due process of law," "equal protection of
the law," "freedom of speech," "cruel and unusual punishment" and
the like. 44 The text of the Constitution offers no explicit45 direction on
the way in which these open-ended provisions should be interpreted.
The methodology, strict or loose, literal or figurative, must be brought
from the outside. The originalist concludes, usually based on an argument from democracy, that the open-ended phrases of the charter
should invalidate only those government practices, or their direct modern analogues, 46 that the framers expressed a desire to proscribe.
Originalist jurisprudence thus employs a substantial interpretive presumption. As Judge Bork has explained, "Courts must accept any
value choice the legislature makes unless it runs clearly contrary to
a choice made in the framing of the Constitution. "47 This strategic
decision, demanded neither by text, intention, 48 or the nature of the
enterprise, is, as Justice Brennan has argued, a political one. 49

44. See generally R. BERGER, surra note 3, at 166-220. Professor Schauer has elegantly
reminded us recently that such open-ended provisions take on exaggerated significance for law
professors - leading too easily to the conclusion that the constitution is fundamentally incomprehensible. Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985).
45. If anything, the text of the Constitution cuts the opposite way than the intentionists
claim. The closest thing to an interpretive mandate in the federal charter is the ninth amendment.
At the very least, the amendment indicates that rights are not to be "denied or disparaged"
because they are not explicitly listed in the Bill of Rights. The amendment was included in
Madison's package to attempt to defeat the inference that government was empowered to
abrogate all rights not clearly set forth in the text. The strong originalist, therefore, embraces
the inference, in the name of legislative intention, which Madison went to such pains to deny.
See Laycock, Taking Co-nstitutions Se'riausly: A Theory of Judicial Review (Book Review), 59
TEX. L. REV. 343, 353 (1981); Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers: Sketching an Ethos of
ConstitutU:mal Libe'rly, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1311-16.
46. It is thought acceptable, for example, to apply fourth amendment principles to electronic
eavesdropping.
47. Bork, surra note 3, at 1.
48. See ge1zemlly Powell, supra note 34.
49. W. Brennan, Speech to Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University (Oct.
12, 1985), ;·eprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE, surra note 3, at 15. Justice Brennan stated:
A position that upholds constitutional claims only if they were within the specific
contemplation of the Framers in effect establishes a presumption . . . against the
claim of constitutional right .... Nothing intrinsic in the nature of interpretation
• . . commands such a passive approach to ambiguity. This is a choice no less
political than any other; it ell.-presses antipathy to claims of the minority rights
against the majority.

624

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. :39

Of course the political choice within the originalist claim is not
without rationale. A reluctance toward the recognition of minority
rights and a passive approach to ambiguity50 are thought necessary
to avoid "being subjected to the whims of willful judges trying to
make the Constitution live. "51 The phrases of the text could bear more
expansive readings than demonstrable intention can support. But in
order to escape the dangers of judicial usurpation, our constitutional
visions of liberty and equality should remain anchored in those of the
framers.
Professor Law's essay demonstrates that this position is most palatable in the abstract. It is easy to suggest generally that judges have
been authorized52 to invalidate only the sorts of evils the framers had
on their minds. The originalist argues simply that the constitutional
provision in question was not designed to prohibit the governmental
activity challenged. Discrimination against women or illegitimates or
homosexuals may indeed be unfortunate. But those practices do not
implicate the fourteenth amendment's notion of equality because they
were not the problems the framers sought to cure.
When made concrete, however, the political choice of the intentionalist faces a heavier burden. The intentionalist's argument suggests
that our constitutional standards of liberty and equality must remain
rooted in a world view, at least for purposes of judicial interpretation,
that denies the very personhood of a substantial segment of our political community. The originalist's policy choice, thus placed appropriately in its context, becomes a comparative one. Once we recall that
neither the language and structure of the text nor the designs of its
framers demands a grounding in specific intention to sustain a claim
of constitutional right, the conjured fear of judicial usurpation must
indeed be strong to force us to tie ourselves to 1791 or 1868. The
intentionalist's desire to focus interpretation strictly on the founders'
world can only be defended as strategic. Professor Law's essay effectively demonstrates that the originalist strategy cannot always be
characterized as a worthy one.
Recall the world she describes. The colonial wife became civilly
"dead" through marriage, subject to physical, sexual, financial, polit-

50. The phrases employed in the constitutional text - freedom of speech, equal protection
of the laws, and the like - often served, of course, by their very ambiguity, to mask disagreements among the framers.
51. See Tushnet, supra note 25, at 787.
52. Of course, permission cannot be used in any strong sense here because it begs the
central issue of the dispute. It is not clear, based on text or intention, that, for example, the
fourteenth amendment constitutionalizes only an 1868 vision of equality or due process.
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ical, and even moral domination by her husband. 53 She was a cog, an
essential one to be sure, but still only a cog in his patriarchal unit,
to be employed as he saw fit. Like the slave and the child, she possessed few rights that her superior partner was obliged to recognize.
Each man needed a family to be complete. Still, it was only the adult
white male in such an arrangement whom the law actually considered
to be an individual.
The most heartening aspect of American history has been its
steady, though painful and grudging, movement away from the elitism
of the founding generation. Although not yet accomplished, 54 its progress has been sufficient to render the world Law describes essentially
unknown to us. I believe contemporary constitutionalists can barely
imagine, let alone resurrect, the degree of subjugation colonial women
experienced. Nor, as Professor Law suggests, can the framers' vision
of se},'Ual equality be squared even with the text of the Constitution
any longer. A conception of the role of women that denies their very
personhood cannot survive the nineteenth amendment as a component
of our constitutive order. The claim that the boundaries of appropriate
interpretation of the constitutional mandates of liberty and equality
must be rooted in the ideologies and practices of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, therefore, fails.
Professor Law's essay, to my untrained eye, is good history. Yet
I doubt stlict intentionalists will welcome it. The originalist jurisprudence assumes we can mentally resurrect a composite framer to instruct constitutional decisionmaking. When presented with a claim to
abortion 1ights or gender equality, our representative founder would
respond, in a felicitous tone, that "those were not the problems that
we sought to address." End of case.
But Professor Law forces the conversation further. The hypothetical framer must explain not only that the challenged government
practice is beyond the reach of the relevant constitutional prohibition,
but why it is so. ''Women," he would continue, "could never be thought
the equal of men. They are incapable of sophisticated thought or conversation. Politics is beyond their competence. And the management
of property is best left to less frivolous minds. They are destined for
the benign offices of wife and mother. Such is the unchanging law of
God."

53. See Law, mqrra note 2, at 590.
54. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (homosell:ual relationships not
constitutionally protected).
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Perhaps this portrait overstates the case. But Law is correct that
the framers' social assumptions about women and the family were "so
profoundly sexist and so foreign to late twentieth century America"55
that they cannot provide a basis for modern constitutional decisionmaking. It is considerably more difficult to demand that we tie ourselves
to the framers' visions of equality once Professor Law has forced us
to wallow in them for a time.
That does not mean that the framers' designs of the Constitution
have no role in modern interpretation. The first step in giving content
to the open-ended phrases of our fundamental charter is to explore
what the draftsmen meant by those terms. On the one hand, this
process is a familiar component in any hermeneutical enterprise. But
even more fundamentally, it gives recognition to our own dependence.
We did not make ourselves. As Alice Walker has written, "the grace
with which we embrace life, in spite of the pain, is always a measm·e
of what has gone before. "56
But the ideas of our forefathers cannot provide a final solution to
our constitutional dilemmas. Transporting ourselves back to the founders' world to legitimize judicial decisionmaking is often neither possible in fact, nor consistent with the constitutional design the framers
chose to employ. Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court in Dted
Scott v. Sandford, 57 it should be remembered, was announced as an
attempt "to interpret the instrument they have framed ... according
to its true intent and meaning when it was adopted. "58 By purporting
to explore "the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they
were conferring special rights and privileges upon the citizens" of the
Union, the Court arrived at its conclusion that neither "the class of
persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants,
whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a
part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words
used in that memorable instrument. "59 The legacy of our forefathers,
in many particulars, is a source of inspiration and pride for American
public life. It is also, on occasion, something to be overcome.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See Law, supra note 2, at 593.
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